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Protecting Negative Equity from Bifurcation Under§ 1325(a)(*) of the Bankruptcy Code
Ryan Taylor*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution confers upon Congress the power "to establish ...
uniform Laws on the Subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States."' However, disuniformity of treatment in bankruptcy occurs
among the states when Congress fails to define a term of art.2 The
hanging paragraph (§ 1325(a)(*)) of the Bankruptcy Code exemplifies
such disuniformity.3 The undefined term is "purchase-money security
interest," 4 and a circuit split has arisen over whether a
purchase-money security interest includes negative equity financing.5
Currently, the Ninth Circuit stands alone and in opposition to the Sec-
ond, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits, holding that negative equity may not be included as part of a
purchase-money security interest. 6 Dissenting opinions and lower
bankruptcy court decisions bolster the Ninth Circuit's stance, despite
being against the majority of its sister circuits.7 Thus, this issue is not
* J.D./M.B.A. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, May 2013; B.A. Philosophy,
Certificate in Business, University of Wisconsin at Madison, Dec. 2009.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
2. Compare AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th
Cir. 2010) (finding that negative equity is not part of a purchase-money security interest), with
Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 585 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2009) (determining that negative
equity is part of a purchase-money security interest as decided by the New York Court of
Appeals).
3. See, e.g., In re Peaslee, 585 F.3d at 56.
4. Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2008).
5. See infra Part IV(A) (discussing the nature of the split and why the split is merely deriva-
tive of state law).
6. See, e.g., Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2010);
Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 2010); In re
Peaslee, 585 F.3d at 57; Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Dale (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cit.
2009); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir.
2009); Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2009); Wells
Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 628 (4th Cir. 2009); Graupner v.
Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008). But see In re Penrod,
611 F.3d at 1163.
7. See, e.g., In re Penrod, 611 F.3d at 1160; In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d at 743-47 (Bye, J.,
dissenting); In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1294 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting); AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc.
v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 BR. 835, 860 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008).
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as seemingly one-sided as a cursory counting of circuit courts would
indicate.
This Note's central issue is how purchase-money security interest
should be interpreted as applied to negative equity, which arises when
a debtor trades in his or her current car with an outstanding balance
and rolls that balance into a financing plan for a new car. Negative
equity is defined as the market value of an old car minus the outstand-
ing balance. 8
Whether negative equity financing is part of a purchase-money se-
curity interest warrants in-depth consideration because a debtor in
Chapter 13 bankruptcy may or may not be required to repay that por-
tion of the transaction in full. On the one hand, the debtor will be
liable for the claim's entirety, including the negative equity financing,
if that financing is part of a purchase-money security interest. On the
other hand, if negative equity financing is not part of a
purchase-money security interest, the negative equity portion of the
claim will be converted into an unsecured claim, reducing the size of
the secured obligation. Accordingly, debtors seek to strip negative
equity from the secured claim to decrease their secured obligations.
Creditors who hope to recoup the total amount of the claim face the
same consequences but with interests inverse to the debtor. 9 The
foregoing outcomes illustrate the substantial economic implications
since nearly 40% of new car purchases include negative equity
financing.10
Bankruptcy courts thus far have provided two different interpreta-
tions of purchase-money security interest that lead to different results
for both the debtor and the creditor." Under the majority of circuit
courts, a purchase-money security interest includes negative equity,
preventing the debtor from splitting the creditor's claim into secured
and unsecured claims under § 1325(a)(*);12 the entire finance plan is a
purchase-money security interest.' 3 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit
considers negative equity a nonpurchase-money security interest
8. See infra Part II(A) (discussing and defining negative equity).
9. See, e.g., In re Peaslee, 547 F.3d at 181.
10. See Danny Hakim, Owing More On an Auto Than It's Worth As a Trade-In, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 27, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/27/business/owing-more-on-an-auto-than-it-s-
worth-as-a-trade-in.html?src=pm (referencing a J.D. Power & Associates's study, which found
that 38% of new car buyers have negative equity, up from 25% in 2001); see also In re Ford, 574
F.3d at 1284.
11. See infra Part II(C) (discussing negative equity and the consequences of its secured or
unsecured status).
12. See, e.g., In re Penrod, 611 F.3d at 1160-61.
13. Id.
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while leaving the outstanding balance solely related to the new car as
a purchase-money security interest.14 Thus, creditors find reprieve in
the majority of circuits and hardship in the Ninth Circuit under Chap-
ter 13; this is inversely so for debtors.
This Note argues that the majority of circuit courts reached the cor-
rect result and that the Ninth Circuit should have reversed a recent
bankruptcy appellate panel's decision to align itself with the majority
of its sister circuits.15 This Note proceeds in three parts. Part II delin-
eates the typical situation in which this issue arises, the relevant bank-
ruptcy statutes, and the consequences resulting from the status of
negative equity as either a purchase-money or a nonpurchase-money
security interest. Part III argues that Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code supports the finding that purchase-money security in-
terests indeed include negative equity financing, and that the policies
underlying the Bankruptcy Code and the Uniform Commercial Code
support this result. In Part IV, collateral issues are discussed, includ-
ing why this is a pseudo split and why Congress need not act.16 Part V
concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Situation in Which Negative Equity Arises
Whether the negative equity portion of a new car purchase is part of
a purchase-money security interest becomes relevant when the debtor
files for bankruptcy under Chapter 13.17 Prior to filing, the situation
typically unravels as follows. The debtor, whom will be referred to as
James, decides to purchase a new car to replace his old car. The new
car's value is $25,000 and the old car's market value is $6,000. James
trades in his old car and receives a $6,000 credit towards the new car.
The old car was originally valued at $20,000, and James took out a
loan in that amount. However, James still owes $10,000 for the old
car. In connection with James's new car purchase, the dealer pays off
the balance of $4,000 on James's previous loan and rolls it into the
price of the new car. This is defined as the negative equity, which is
14. Id. at 1164.
15. See generally AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2008).
16. The dual status rule and the transformation rule are inconsequential to the analysis herein
and thus are not discussed; they are relevant only in jurisdictions that do not consider negative
equity as part of a purchase-money security interest. See Geoffrey M. Collins, Note, Negative
Equity and Purchase-Money Security Interests Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the
BAPCPA, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 161, 172-75 (2009), for a general discussion of both rules.
17. See Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 2008).
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the market value of the old car, $6,000, less the outstanding debt,
$10,000. Thus, the total amount financed for the new car is $29,000,
which consists of the new car's value of $25,000 and the negative eq-
uity valued at $4,000.18 With his obligations tidily rolled into a single
finance plan, James files for bankruptcy within 910 days after purchas-
ing the new car.19 In so filing, James and similarly situated debtors
expose the disuniformity between the circuits in defining
purchase-money security interest and its scope.
B. The Central Bankruptcy Statutes: § 506 and § 1325(a)(*)
Generally, Chapter 13 bankruptcy grants debtors two options.
First, the debtor may opt to surrender the collateral. 20 Surrendering
the collateral satisfies the creditor's secured claim, "leaving the credi-
tor with only an unsecured deficiency claim." 21 The unsecured por-
tion is repaid on the same terms as other unsecured claims. 22 Thus,
the debtor's surrender of the collateral effectively bifurcates the credi-
tor's claim because the creditor's secured claim is satisfied by repos-
sessing the collateral, and the debtor's remaining amount owed
becomes an unsecured claim.23
Second, the debtor may elect to keep the collateral.24 The credi-
tor's objection to this option will go ignored so long as the debtor
makes payments equivalent to the market value of the collateral to
the creditor.25 Under this option, § 506(a)(1) requires that the al-
lowed secured claim be equivalent to the value of the collateral. 26
Section 506(a)(1) provides, in part, that:
18. See In re Penrod, 611 F.3d at 1159, for another example to help clarify the concept of
negative equity being rolled into the price of a new car. Negative equity creates further
problems in states that permit the debtor to bifurcate the creditor's claim. See also Ford v. Ford
Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1290 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
Debtor's payments prior to filing for bankruptcy must be adjusted to determine whether they
apply, and to what proportion they apply, to either the nonpurchase-money portion or to the
purchase-money portion. Id.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(*) (2006) ("For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply
to a claim described in that paragraph if the creditor has a purchase-money security interest
securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within the 910-day period
preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor
vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49) acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or if
collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-
year period preceding that filing.").
20. See Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 506 (6th Cir. 2010).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 2010).
25. Id.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006).
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[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in
which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent
of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest ... in
such property . .. and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the
value of such creditor's interest is less than the amount of such al-
lowed claim . . . . Such value shall be determined in light of the
purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of
such property .... 27
Thus, the creditor's claim is secured up to the value of the collateral
and unsecured for the amount of the claim in excess of the value of
the collateral. 28 Bifurcating the secured creditor's claim is often re-
ferred to as "stripping down" or "cramming down" the secured claim
to the collateral's value.29
Though debtors generally find reprieve under § 506(a)(1), Congress
added § 1325(a)(*) as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) in response to com-
plaints from car dealers and financiers.30 Section 1325(a)(*) aims to
curtail bankruptcy abuse by preventing debtors from purchasing vehi-
cles and then declaring bankruptcy, which would allow them to keep
the vehicle and merely pay for its depreciated value.31  Section
1325(a)(*) proscribes the bifurcation of a claim in two contexts. 32
First, § 1325(a)(*) applies when five conditions are met:
1. the creditor must have a purchase-money security interest;
2. that purchase-money security interest must secure the debt;
3. the debt must have been incurred within 910 days preceding the
date of the filing of the petition;
4. the collateral for that debt must consist of a motor vehicle; and
5. the motor vehicle must have been acquired for the debtor's per-
sonal use.33
Second, § 1325(a)(*) applies where the collateral for the debt consists
of anything of value, other than a vehicle, provided that the debt was
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. E.g., In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 853; Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562
F.3d 618, 628 (4th Cir. 2009).
30. In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 854.
31. Id. at 854-55.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(*) ("For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply to a
claim described in that paragraph if the creditor has a purchase-money security interest securing
the debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within the 910-day period preced-
ing the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor
vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49) acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or if
collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-
year period preceding that filing.").
33. Id.
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incurred within one year prior to filing for bankruptcy. 34 This Note
concerns only the first application of § 1325(a)(*).
This Note's central issue is whether a purchase-money security in-
terest includes negative equity. Congress made clear under what con-
ditions § 1325(a)(*) applies with the unambiguous language of
§ 1325(a)(*), but left to the states the responsibility of defining the
scope of a purchase-money security interest.35
C. Consequences Resulting from Negative Equity's Characterization
Chapter 13 requires debtors to pay all secured claims in full.36 An
unsecured claim need not be paid in full, provided that the debtor
pays all disposable income over the life of the plan;37 unsecured credi-
tors must also receive as much of the debtor's payment plan as they
would otherwise receive if the debtor's assets were liquated under
Chapter 7.38 The difference in secured and unsecured claims high-
lights the importance of determining whether negative equity can be
included as part of a purchase-money security interest, especially be-
cause negative equity financing can represent a substantial percentage
of the finance plan. 39
The transactions brought before the circuits show that, on average,
19.8% of the total amount financed was negative equity.40 Between
these cases, the lowest percentage was 9.9% in the Fifth Circuit41
whereas the highest was 26.4% in the Eighth Circuit.42 Furthermore,
the average dollar amount of negative equity between the appellate
34. Id.
35. E.g., In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 855.
36. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 842 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2008).
37. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1325. See generally Chapter 13: Individual Debt Adjustment, UNITED STATES
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapterl3.aspx
(last visited Nov. 5, 2012) (providing a basic description of the Chapter 13 process).
39. E.g., In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 855 (determining that $8,000, or 22.5%, of the $35,500
finance plan constituted negative equity).
40. See AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1159-60 (9th
Cir. 2010); Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2010); In
re Howard, 597 F.3d at 855; Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Dale (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 570-71
(5th Cir. 2009); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 741 (8th
Cir. 2009); Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1281 (10th Cir. 2009);
Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 621-22 (4th Cir. 2009); Reiber v.
GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d 177, 181 (2d Cir. 2008); Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp.
(In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir. 2008).
41. In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 570-71.
42. In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d at 741.
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cases was $5,976.43 The lowest amount of negative equity financed
was $2,838 in the Fourth Circuit," and the highest amount was $8,071
in the Eighth Circuit.45
These figures bring to light the two significant consequences result-
ing from negative equity's classification as either a purchase-money
security interest or a nonpurchase-money security interest. First,
creditors in jurisdictions in which negative equity is included as part of
a purchase-money security interest enjoy the benefits attendant to
that status. Purchase-money security interests "enjoy 'super-priority'
rights over other types of security interests and liens." 46 As stated in
section 9-324(a), "a perfected purchase-money security interest in
goods . . . has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same
goods." 47 Thus, sellers or financiers holding a purchase-money secur-
ity interest in vehicles are guaranteed to receive the present value of
the entire claim under Chapter 13 bankruptcy, not just the present
value of the vehicle.48 This creditor-friendly result ensures that the
seller or financier will recoup the total amount financed, including
negative equity that may represent up to 26.4% of the total amount
borrowed to finance the purchase.49 The importance of this result is
further highlighted by the fact that nearly 40% of all vehicles financed
in the United States include rolled-in negative equity.50
Second, creditors are disadvantaged in jurisdictions that construe
negative equity as a nonpurchase-money security interest. Here, the
total amount of the claim is crammed down to the value of the collat-
eral, granting the creditor a secured claim up to the value of the collat-
eral and an unsecured claim for the portion representing the negative
equity.51 However, the creditor's unsecured claim is no windfall be-
43. See In re Penrod, 611 F.3d at 1159-60; In re Westfall, 599 F.3d at 500; In re Howard, 597
F.3d at 855; In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 570-71; In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d at 741; In re Ford, 574
F.3d at 1281; In re Price, 562 F.3d at 621-22; In re Peaslee, 547 F.3d at 180-81; In re Graupner,
537 F.3d at 1298 (11th Cir. 2008).
44. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 621.
45. In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d at 741. All numbers in notes 40-45 were rounded for clarity.
46. In re Penrod, 611 F.3d at 1161.
47. U.C.C. § 9-324 (2011). See generally Grant Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76
HARv. L. REV. 1333 (1963) (discussing Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code's triumph in
holding superior purchase-money security interests over after-acquired property interests).
48. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(*) (2006) (assuming that all five conditions listed in
1325(a)(*) are satisfied to prevent the debtor from cramming down the claim to the collateral's
value).
49. See Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 2010).
50. E.g., Hakim, supra note 10; Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279,
1284 (10th Cir. 2009).
51. In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 853-54.
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cause such claims are typically worth little in bankruptcy. 52 Again,
this amount is substantial to creditors because it may represent a quar-
ter of the total amount the debtor borrowed to finance the purchase
of the new car. Both of these outcomes play into the policy that
courts provide to justify their conclusions in characterizing negative
equity.53
III. ANALYSIS
A preliminary issue that courts must address is whether federal or
state law governs interests in property. 54 Many circuit courts have
found that state law governs, reasoning that it typically creates prop-
erty rights in bankruptcy.5 5 This reasoning derives from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Butner v. United States:
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless
some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason
why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an
interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform
treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts
within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum
shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving a windfall merely
by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy. The justifications for
application of state law are not limited to ownership interests; they
apply with equal force to security interests . .. .56
Federal law thereafter dictates whether an interest in property is en-
forceable under Chapter 13 once the status of the security interest is
determined.57
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Con-
gress the power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws,5 8 but Congress
forewent the opportunity to provide a uniform definition of property
rights in the context of bankruptcy law under § 1325(a)(*).59 Prior to
52. Id. at 854.
53. See infra Part III (discussing the arguments for including negative equity as part of a
purchase-money security interest).
54. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 624 (4th Cir.
2009).
55. See, e.g., Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2010);
In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 855; Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Dale (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 573
(5th Cir. 2009); In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1283; In re Price, 562 F.3d at 624; Reiber v. GMAC, LLC
(In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d 177, 184 (2d Cir. 2008).
56. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (emphasis added) (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs.
Nat'] Bank, 664 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. 9A AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1543 (2011).
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
59. In re Peaslee, 547 F.3d at 184-86 (certifying question to the Court of Appeals of New York
to clarify the meaning of purchase-money security interest under New York law).
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the enactment of § 1325(a)(*), courts generally looked to state law to
define purchase-money security interest 60: "Congress, presumably
aware that its prior use of this term of art had led courts to resort to
state law," again left the term undefined, evincing as its intent the
continued resort to state law.61 This Note will treat as resolved in
favor of state law the subordinate issue of whether federal or state law
governs property interests.
A. Parsing the Uniform Commercial Code for Guidance
The Uniform Commercial Code provides both a firm ground upon
which courts reason that negative equity is part of a purchase-money
security interest and a logical place to look for guidance because Arti-
cle 9 defines both security interests in personal property and
purchase-money security interests.62 Three definitions listed under
section 9-103 of Article 9 allow for a syllogistic approach to ascertain-
ing the definition of purchase-money security interest: "[a] security
interest in goods is a purchase-money security interest . . . to the ex-
tent that the goods are purchase-money collateral with respect to that
security interest;" 63 "purchase-money collateral" means "goods . . .
that secure[ ] a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to
that collateral;" 64 a "purchase-money obligation" is an "obligation of
an obligor incurred as all or part of the price of the collateral or for
value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the
collateral if the value is in fact so used." 65
Thus, the two-prong definition of purchase-money obligation estab-
lishes two ways in which a purchase-money obligation may arise: (1)
where an obligation of the debtor is incurred as all or part of the
"price" of the collateral or (2) where the debtor is given "value" to
enable the debtor to acquire the collateral. 66 The two prongs serve to
reinforce that the debtor's purchase-money obligation can be to ei-
ther a dealer or a third party financier. 67
60. E.g., In re Price, 562 F.3d at 624.
61. Id. (quoting In re Peaslee, 547 F.3d at 184 n.13) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re
Peaslee, 547 F.3d at 184 n.13.
62. E.g., Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 855 (7th Cir. 2010).
63. U.C.C. § 9-103(b)(1) (2011).
64. Id. § 9-103(a)(1).
65. Id. § 9-103(a)(2).
66. Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 387, 389 (N.Y. 2009).
67. E.g., In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 855-56 ("The 'value given' part of the definition is in-
tended to make clear that the obligations can be to a finance company, as in this case, rather
than to the seller.").
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Generally, courts that construe these Uniform Commercial Code
provisions use a two-step framework. 68 First, a court will determine
whether negative equity properly falls within one of the two prongs in
section 9-103(a)(2). 69 Second, if that condition is satisfied, the
purchase-money security interest must have a "close nexus between
the acquisition of collateral and the secured obligation."70 Although,
Official Comment 3 (Comment 3) to section 9-103 states that "a secur-
ity interest does not qualify as a purchase-money security interest if a
debtor acquires property on unsecured credit and subsequently cre-
ates the security interest to secure the purchase price."71
The language contained in section 9-103 does not readily make clear
whether the definition of purchase-money obligation encompasses
negative equity financing.72 All circuit courts that have addressed this
issue look to Comment 3 to aid their interpretations.73 As the Fifth
Circuit recognized, the Uniform Commercial Code's Official Com-
ments are undoubtedly "the most useful aids to interpretation and
construction." 74 Though the Official Comments are not binding, they
"occupy an unusual position as aids to statutory interpretation" and
are "an indispensible [sic] part of the [Uniform Commercial Code]
framework."75 Thus, Courts have favorably looked to Comment 3,
which provides a non-exhaustive list of items that constitute a
purchase-money security interest:
[T]he "price" of collateral or the "value given to enable" includes
obligations for expenses incurred in connection with acquiring
rights in the collateral, sales taxes, duties, finance charges, interest,
freight charges, costs of storage in transit, demurrage, administra-
68. E.g., In re Peaslee, 913 N.E.2d at 389-90.
69. E.g., id. at 389.
70. Id. at 390 (quoting U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3) (internal quotation marks omitted) (concluding
that the financing of negative equity was "inextricably linked to the financing of the new car").
71. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3.
72. Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d 177, 185 (2d Cir. 2008).
73. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cin. 2010);
Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 502-03 (6th Cir. 2010); Howard v.
AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 2010); Ford Motor Credit
Corp. v. Dale (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 2009); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkow-
ski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 742 (8th Cir. 2009); Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re
Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 2009); Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price),
562 F.3d 618, 626 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Peaslee, 547 F.3d at 185; Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp.
(In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2008).
74. In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 574 (quoting Weathersby v. Gore, 556 F.2d 1247, 1256 (5th Cir.
1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Sean Michael Hannaway, The Jurisprudence and Judicial Treatment of the Comments to
the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 962, 962, 967 (1990).
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tive charges, expenses of collection and enforcement, attorney's
fees, and other similar obligations.76
That negative equity is included between the listed items is both con-
ceivable and within reason.77 Specifically, negative equity may prop-
erly fall within expenses incurred in connection with acquiring rights in
the collateral or other similar obligations listed in Comment 3.78
The Seventh Circuit said of the former that it "seems a pretty good
description of negative equity;"79 the debtor assumes the obligation in
connection with his acquiring ownership of the vehicle. 0 Other cir-
cuit courts have similarly concluded that negative equity indeed falls
within other similar obligations.8 1 Therefore, satisfying either prong
permits a finding that negative equity is included as a
purchase-money security interest, given that the second step is
satisfied.
Set forth below are three arguments in support of finding that nega-
tive equity is part of a purchase-money security interest, all of which
derive from the Uniform Commercial Code: (1) that negative equity
financing is part of the price of the vehicle; (2) that negative equity
financing is value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in the
vehicle; and (3) that a close nexus exists between the acquisition of
collateral and the secured obligation. The first two arguments speak
to the first step, arguing that both seller- and financier-based new car
purchases may include negative equity financing as part of a
purchase-money security interest. Satisfying either prong permits
progression to the second step. The third argument concludes that a
close nexus exists between negative equity financing and the debtor's
acquisition of the collateral, i.e. the second step.
1. The First Prong: "Price"
The Chapter 13 debtor is liable for a purchase-money obligation if
that obligation is "incurred as all or part of the price of the collat-
eral." 82 Courts generally look to the categories in Comment 3 to de-
termine whether price is sufficiently broad to encompass negative
76. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3.
77. E.g., In re Peaslee, 547 F.3d at 185-86.
78. Id. at 185 (citation omitted).
79. Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2010).
80. Id.
81. Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Dale (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 2009); Graupner
v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008) (emphasizing that
Comment 3 includes other similar obligations).
82. U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2) (2011).
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equity.83 The other similar obligations language of the Official Com-
ments clarifies that the enumerated expenses are examples and non-
exhaustive.84 Many of the examples listed-together with the expan-
sive terms obligations for expenses incurred in connection with acquir-
ing rights in the collateral and other similar obligations-indicate that
the definition of price should be interpreted broadly.85 Furthermore,
the expenses listed in Comment 3 "include certain expenses that
might not otherwise come within the common understanding of
'price." 86  Thus, a correct reading of Comment 3, backed by the ca-
nons of construction, demonstrates that negative equity financing can
give rise to a purchase-money security interest.87
The inclusion of certain expenses precludes a finding that price is
limited to the vehicle's price tag.88 The expenses in support of this
proposition are freight charges, demurrage, administrative charges,
expenses of collection and enforcement, and attorney's fees. 89 Both
the Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit noted that negative equity
properly falls within price because the express inclusion of attorney's
fees nullifies the notion that price includes only "those . . . expenses
that must be paid to drive the car off the lot." 90 Indeed, the expenses
enumerated in Comment 3 merely share one common feature: a slight
connection to the acquisition or maintenance of the vehicle.91 Ejus-
dem generis "counsels that general words following an enumeration of
particular or specified items should be construed to fall into the same
class as those items specifically named." 92 Thus, negative equity satis-
fies the definition of purchase-money security interest because it so
falls within the same class of items listed in Comment 393: It is "inex-
83. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2010);
Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 502-03 (6th Cir. 2010); In re
Howard, 597 F.3d at 856; In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 574; Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re
Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 742 (8th Cir. 2009); Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford),
574 F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 2009); Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d
618, 626 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Peaslee, 547 F.3d at 185; In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1301-02.
84. In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 574; see also U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3.
85. In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1302 (citation omitted).
86. In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 574.
87. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 626.
88. See In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 574; In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1302.
89. In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 574.
90. Id.; In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1302 (quoting In re Myers, 393 B.R. 616, 620 (Bankr. S.D.
Ind. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 574 ("[Tlhe listed expenses in Comment 3 have no common feature
beyond an attenuated connection to the acquisition or maintenance of the vehicle.").
92. Id. at 575 n.6 (quoting Weisbart & Co. v. First Nat'1 Bank of Dalhart, Tex., 568 F.2d 391,
395 n.6 (5th Cir. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2010).
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tricably intertwined," not merely attenuated, with the debtor's acqui-
sition of the vehicle. 94
Other expenses listed in Comment 3-such as taxes, duties, and in-
terest-are best characterized as transaction costs associated with
buying a new car. 95 Such costs are not directly related to the value of
the collateral, but facilitate the debtor's acquisition of the collateral. 96
Negative equity shares this common feature; it facilitates and relates
to the acquisition of the vehicle.97 Noscitur a socils instructs that "[a]
word is known by the company it keeps." 98 The context provided by
the expenses listed in Comment 3 buttresses the conclusion that nega-
tive equity is a transaction cost incurred in connection with acquiring
the vehicle. 99 Neither taxes, duties, nor interest is related to the value
of the new car. 10o Those three categories are expenses beyond the
collateral's value. Negative equity, similar to the foregoing transac-
tion costs, is beyond the car's value, enables its acquisition, and thus
may give rise to a purchase-money security interest.101 Yet, negative
equity also shares a similarity with the enumerated expenses, such as
expenses of collection and enforcement, and attorney's fees, both of
which are incurred to ensure that the creditor realizes the value of the
security interest10 2: "[tihe discharge of negative equity clears the title
of the trade-in vehicle, permitting the creditor to realize the value of
the vehicle it receives as part of the trade."103 This ensures that the
creditor collects its benefit in the entire transaction.104 Thus, two con-
texts within the enumerated list in Comment 3 urge a finding that
purchase-money security interest may include negative equity
financing.
Comment 3 also provides that price includes "expenses incurred in
connection with acquiring rights in the collateral," which indeed en-
compasses negative equity. This category can be said to stand alone
94. See id. at 505.
95. Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 627 (4th Cir. 2009) (cita-
tion omitted).
96. Id.
97. In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 574.
98. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 626-27 (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
99. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 626-27 (citation omitted).
100. Id.; Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 387, 389 (N.Y. 2009) ("[J]ust as
'finance charges' and 'interest' constitute obligations that are paid over and above the vehicle's
actual cost (such charges being incurred as part of the overall financing of the vehicle), negative
equity is likewise part of the overall price of a new vehicle.").
101. See In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627.
102. Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2009).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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because "language like 'such as' or 'including"' is absent between this
phrase and the additional, subsequent listed expenses. 05 At first
glance, no language in section 9-103 makes apparent any reason why
the financing of negative equity could not fall under an "expense[ ]
incurred in connection with acquiring rights in the collateral."106 An
agreement between the buyer and the seller where the seller's refi-
nancing of negative equity is an "integral part" of the transaction may
properly fall within that category.107 To be sure, a New York district
court stated that "it is in fact difficult to see how that [refinancing]
could not be viewed as such an expense."10 The Fifth Circuit applied
the above reasoning as well, quoting that district court.109
The Sixth Circuit adopted reasoning similar to the New York Dis-
trict Court. 10 Sitting in Ohio, the Sixth Circuit referred to an Ohio
Supreme Court case that further recognized the "integral connection
between the payoff of a trade-in vehicle's negative equity and the
purchase of a new vehicle on an installment basis."11 The Ohio Su-
preme Court characterized this routine transaction as the "practical
method of facilitating the release of an outstanding security interest in
order that the trade-in allowance can be made." 112 Furthermore, neg-
ative equity financing is typically included in the same contract as the
car purchase and executed at the same time, evidencing negative eq-
uity financing as an expense necessary to acquire rights in the
vehicle. 13
Another statutory scheme that courts read in pari materia with Arti-
cle 9 are certain states' respective vehicle sales acts.114 Compelling
105. Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Dale (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2009).
106. Id. at 575.
107. Id.
108. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Peaslee (In re Peaslee), 373 B.R. 252, 259 (W.D.N.Y.
2007).
109. In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 575.
110. Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2010).
111. Id.
112. Id. (quoting Johns v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 551 N.E.2d 179, 183 (Ohio 1990)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). "It is a matter of common knowledge that most new car sales are
accompanied by trade-ins. Inclusion of the negative equity of a trade-in is nothing more than a
convenient means of accommodating a buyer who is offering a depreciated trade-in. It is, in
other words, a practical method of facilitating the release of an outstanding security interest in
order that the trade-in allowance can be made . . . . Here, appellees were able to purchase the
specific automobiles they desired because their trade-ins were afforded more value on paper
than they actually had. They received the benefits of the negotiations and the agreements."
Johns, 551 N.E.2d at 183.
113. See Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 626 (4th Cir. 2009).
114. See, e.g., AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th
Cir. 2010); Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 2010);
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 2009); Ford
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this appeal to other statutes is section 9-201, which mandates courts to
look to consumer statutes for transactions governed by Article 9: "[a]
transaction subject to this article is subject to any applicable rule of
law which establishes a different rule for consumers."115 Generally,
these acts define terms such as "cash sale price" 116 and "time sale
price,"117 from which courts determine that including negative equity
financing as part of the price is consistent with both the Uniform
Commercial Code and a state's respective vehicle sales act.118 How-
ever, this reasoning is admittedly not without issue. As Judge Posner
conceded:
[Pirobably the [Illinois Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act]
shouldn't be read literally as encompassing our case. It's a con-
sumer-protection statute, intended to require disclosure of the
charges that make up the total price that a consumer pays for the
car, rather than to prescribe what is and is not included in the
purchase-money security interest. But it is at least evidence that
negative equity is indeed a common element of a credit purchase of
a car, and this will turn out to be important to our analysis.119
Thus, to read the vehicle sales acts in pari materia with Article 9 none-
theless demonstrates that including negative equity financing in price
is consistent with both statutes. 120 Ultimately, this analysis should not
be dispositive of the issue, nor has it been. Other canons of construc-
v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1292 (10th Cir. 2009); Reiber v. GMAC,
LLC (In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d 177, 186 (2d Cir. 2008); Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re
Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008).
115. U.C.C. § 9-201 (2011); In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 856.
116. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 365.020(1) (West 2011) ("[T]he price stated in a retail install-
ment contract for which the seller would have sold to the buyer, and the buyer would have
bought from the seller, the motor vehicle which is the subject matter of the retail installment
contract, if the sale had been a sale for cash or at a cash price instead of a retail installment
transaction at a time sale price. The cash sale price may include any taxes, registration, certifi-
cate of title, license and other fees and charges for accessories and their installment and for
delivery, servicing, repairing or improving the motor vehicle.").
117. See, e.g., id. ("[T]he total of the cash sale price of the motor vehicle and the amount, if
any, included for insurance and other benefits if a separate identified charge is made therefor
and the amounts of the official fees and time price differential."). The Illinois Motor Vehicle
Retail Installment Sales Act states that the amount financed includes "all other charges individu-
ally itemized, which are included in the amount financed, including the amount actually paid or
to be paid by the seller pursuant to an agreement with the buyer to discharge a security interest,
lien interest, or lease interest on the property traded in, but which are not a part of the finance
charge, minus the amount of the buyer's down payment in money or goods." 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 375/2.8 (West 2011). This language perfectly describes negative equity. In re How-
ard, 597 F.3d at 856.
118. See In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d at 743; In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1301.
119. See In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 857.
120. See, e.g., AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th
Cir. 2010); In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 856-57; Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d
177, 186 (2d Cir. 2008). But see In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d at 743 (finding no issue with the
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tion provide additional support for including negative equity financing
in price, as discussed above. Comment 3 provides support sufficient
to so conclude, making any appeal to vehicle sales acts superfluous.
In sum, negative equity appropriately falls within the listed obliga-
tions in Comment 3 because those categories are sufficiently broad to
encompass negative equity and because negative equity is integral to
this prevalent vehicle sales practice, thereby constituting part of a
purchase-money security interest under the first prong.121 The second
step, however, must still be satisfied.
2. The Second Prong: "Value"
Negative equity financing comfortably fits within the second prong
of purchase-money obligation, which is "value given to enable the
debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the collateral if the value is in
fact so used."122 The Fourth Circuit first defined "enable" to begin its
analysis.123 Enable means "to give power to do something" or "to
make able."124 A creditor's financing of negative equity can be said
"to make able" the acquisition of the collateral because the acquisi-
tion would not have occurred except for that financing.125 Further-
more, the debtor typically incurs the entire obligation in the same
contract and at the same time for the sole purpose of acquiring the
new vehicle.126 Thus, negative equity truly enables the debtor to ac-
quire rights in the vehicle because the negative equity financing and
the purchase were a "package deal."127 Similarly, but for the negative
equity financing, the debtor could not have acquired rights in the new
vehicle.128
Some bankruptcy courts have argued that a distinction exists "be-
tween enabling a transaction to occur and enabling a debtor to acquire
rights in new collateral .... "129 These courts claim that negative eq-
uity only enables the transaction to occur, thereby precluding negative
equity as a purchase-money security interest because it does not go
difference in purpose between the Uniform Commercial Code and the Missouri Motor Vehicle
Time Sales Act).
121. Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2010).
122. U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2) (2011).
123. Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 625 (4th Cir. 2009).
124. BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 606 (9th ed. 2009).
125. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 625.
126. In re Westfall, 599 F.3d at 505.
127. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 625.
128. Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2009)
("[D]ischarging negative equity is necessary to complete the trade-in because otherwise the
dealer would take the old vehicle subject to a lien exceeding the vehicle's value.").
129. In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 856 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007).
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towards the value of the collateral itself.130 This distinction is mean-
ingless.131 A transaction in which negative equity financing enabled
the transaction to occur necessarily enables the acquisition of rights in
the collateral.132 Negative equity is essential because debtors require
the trade-in value to put towards the new car.' 33 And if that trade-in
carries negative equity, it must be extinguished because creditors are
generally unwilling to accept a trade-in with an outstanding lien that
hinders the dealer's or financier's ability to resell the vehicle.134
Therefore, negative equity financing is a precondition to acquiring
rights in the new vehicle. 35
The Ninth Circuit and other bankruptcy courts have also argued
that negative equity financing is an antecedent debt, precluding it
from constituting value for purposes of the second prong.136 These
courts further assert that the contemporaneous nature of the negative
equity financing and the new car purchase does not create a
purchase-money security interest because no "new value" is given.137
This characterization, however, is mistaken. The negative equity por-
tion of the debtor's obligation to the seller or financier does not
amount to a refinancing of an antecedent debt. 38 The debtor owes
nothing to the seller or financier that extends credit to purchase the
new car prior to financing the negative equity.139 Instead, the debtor
owed an obligation to an unrelated third party.140 Therefore, the
seller or financier financing both the purchase of the new car and the
negative equity provides all new credit to the debtor, thereby extin-
guishing the antecedent debt.141
130. See, e.g., id.
131. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 625 ("From a practical perspective, that distinction is meaningless.
If negative equity financing enabled the transaction in which the new car was acquired, then, in
reality, the negative equity financing also enabled the acquisition of rights in the new car. And
that was the case here. The trade-in itself was essential to the overall transaction because trading
in the old car allowed the Prices to obtain value to put toward the new car. But the Prices could
not have traded in their old car unless they also extinguished their negative equity: car dealers
are generally unwilling to accept a trade-in with an outstanding lien because the lien makes it
difficult for the dealer to resell the car.").
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 626-27.
136. See AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir.
2010).
137. See, e.g., id. at 1162-63.
138. Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 505 (6th Cir. 2010).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit's argument that a purchase-money security inter-
est can only arise for "new value" is similarly unavailing. 142 Utilizing
the in pari materia canon-"the canon that encourages courts to con-
strue statutes together"I 43-the Ninth Circuit cited to § 547, which de-
fines new value.144 Specifically, the court focused on a particular
clause: "new value . . . does not include an obligation substituted for
an existing obligation."1 4 5 This same language is included in section 9-
102 of the Uniform Commercial Code.146 The court concluded that
repackaging old obligations does not constitute new value.147 While
that seems a correct reading of new value, nowhere in section 9-103 is
value qualified by new.148 Furthermore, Official Comment 21 to sec-
tion 9-102 expressly states that new value is used with respect to "tem-
porary perfection of security interests in instruments, certificated
securities, or negotiable documents . . . and with respect to chattel
paper priority ... " 1 4 9 Under the canon of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius-i.e. the express mention of one thing excludes all others-
purchase-money security interests should be excluded from Official
Comment 21.150 This allows a reasonable inference that new value
should not be read into the definition of "purchase-money obliga-
tion" in section 9-103(a)(2), especially since no inclusionary language
is used. Thus, the definition of new value is inapplicable to section 9-
103(a)(2); the value supplied by the dealer or financier discharging the
negative equity in the trade-in vehicle need not be characterized as
new value.15
Article 1, Article 3, and Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
provide further evidence that value may include negative equity fi-
nancing, even if negative equity is more properly considered as an an-
tecedent debt.152 Section 3-303(a)(3) states that a negotiable
instrument is "issued or transferred for value if the instrument is is-
142. In re Penrod, 611 F.3d at 1162.
143. Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1291 (10th Cir. 2009).
144. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) (2006) ("'[N]ew value' means money or money's worth in goods,
services, or new credit, or release by a transferee of property previously transferred to such
transferee in a transaction that is neither void nor voidable by the debtor or the trustee under
any applicable law, including proceeds of such property, but does not include an obligation sub-
stituted for an existing obligation."); In re Penrod, 611 F.3d at 1163-64.
145. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2); In re Penrod, 611 F.3d at 1163-64 (emphasis omitted).
146. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(57) (2011).
147. In re Penrod, 611 F.3d at 1164.
148. U.C.C. § 9-103.
149. Id. § 9-102 cmt. 21.
150. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002) (discussing expressio unius).
151. Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 505 (6th Cir. 2010).
152. However, this argument is forceful only if negative equity can be properly characterized
as an antecedent debt; a characterization against which this Note argues because the new credi-
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sued or transferred as payment of, or as security for, an antecedent
claim against any person ... s153 Additionally, section 9-403 refer-
ences section 3-303(a) for its definition of value.154 Thus, value need
not be new and may include antecedent debts under Article 3 and
Article 9's section 9-403.
The definition of value under Article 1 supports this interpretation,
despite recognizing that Article 3 may provide otherwise.'5 5 Under
section 1-204(2), "a person gives value for rights if the person acquires
them as security for, or in total or partial satisfaction of, a preexisting
claim."' 56 This definition of value extends to "consideration suffi-
cient to support a simple contract"' 57 and is not a demanding crite-
rion;158 it extends to both the assumption of an antecedent debt and
the granting of a security interest.159 Such an interpretation is well-
aligned with a purpose and policy of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which "must be liberally construed and applied to promote its under-
lying purposes and policies," one of which is "to permit the continued
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agree-
ment of the parties."160 Accordingly, construing value to include ei-
ther the assumption of an antecedent debt or the granting of a security
interest is supported by the definitions, policies, and purposes of the
Uniform Commercial Code.16 '
This definition of value is broad enough to include negative equity
financing for purchase-money security interests under the second
prong. By extinguishing the preexisting claim and acquiring a
purchase-money security interest, the financier has provided value ac-
cording to section 1-204. Furthermore, this value "is in fact so
used"162 to acquire rights in the vehicle because the debtor could not
have acquired the vehicle but for the negative equity" financing. The
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit argued otherwise,
stating that no connection existed between the negative equity financ-
tor discharges the antecedent debt and provides new credit to the debtor. See infra Part
III(A)(2) (discussing the improper characterization of negative equity as an antecedent debt).
153. U.C.C. § 3-303(a)(3) (emphasis added).
154. Id. § 9-403(a).
155. Id. §§ 1-204, 3-303.
156. Id. § 1-204(2).
157. Id. § 1-204(4).
158. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 851 n.19 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2008).
159. Id.; U.C.C. § 1-204.
160. U.C.C. § 1-103(a).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 9-103(a)(2).
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ing and the vehicle's acquisition. 163 It then argued that the missing
connection here is similar to the case in which a car lender rolls the
debtor's mortgage into the amount financed as well.'" Admittedly,
the latter situation does not possess the necessary connection because
of its vastly differing circumstances. 165 However, the Bankruptcy Ap-
pellate Panel erred in claiming that no nexus exists between negative
equity financing and the debtor's acquisition of the vehicle.166
3. A Close Nexus Exists Between the Acquisition of the Collateral
and the Secured Obligation
Comment 3 provides that a purchase-money security interest "re-
quires a close nexus between the acquisition of the collateral and the
secured obligation."1 67 This requirement constitutes the second step
in the two-step framework.168 The Eleventh Circuit described nega-
tive equity financing and the new car purchase as a "package deal."169
Both parts occurred simultaneously within the same transaction, and
the creditor's paying off the trade-in's outstanding balance was a nec-
essary precondition to the vehicle's purchase: the debtor could not
have acquired rights in the vehicle but for the negative equity financ-
ing.170 Additionally, extinguishing the lien on the trade-in allows the
creditor to sell it, making the sale of the new vehicle possible.171
Therefore, negative equity is both essential to and "inextricably inter-
twined" with the sales transaction, creating a close nexus between the
acquisition of the collateral and the secured obligation.172 To con-
clude otherwise would "not be a fair reading of the [Uniform Com-
mercial Code]."' 73
The Fourth Circuit concluded likewise,174 but added another com-
pelling reason for finding a close nexus.175 The court distinguished
transactions in which the creditor's security interest arises simultane-
163. In re Penrod, 392 B.R. at 852.
164. Id.
165. Cf Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 627 (4th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that unrelated transactions being rolled into a purchase-money security interest pre-
sent "very different circumstances").
166. See infra Part III(A)(3) (discussing whether a close nexus exists).
167. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3.
168. See Reiber v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Peaslee), 585 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir.
2009).
169. Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2008).
170. Id.
171. Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 505 (6th Cir. 2010).
172. In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1302.
173. Id.
174. Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 627 (4th Cir. 2009).
175. Id.
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ously with the negative equity financing from transactions in which
this process is staggered.176 The second paragraph of Comment 3 pro-
vides an exclusionary effect: a purchase-money security interest can-
not arise where the debtor acquires property on unsecured credit and
subsequently creates a security interest in the property to secure the
purchase price.177 Negative equity financing is distinct from that stag-
gered situation. 178 Here, the creditor's security interest in the pur-
chased car arises concurrently with its financing of the negative
equity.179 Thus, the second paragraph of Comment 3 does not pre-
clude courts from finding that a close nexus exists. 80
Debtors have put forth a hyperbolic counterargument against the
finding of a close nexus. 8 Debtors in the Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits argued that to find a close nexus could result in predatory
lending.182 The general concern is that finding a close nexus between
negative equity financing and acquiring rights in a new vehicle will
require a close nexus to be found "whenever a lender bundles an oth-
erwise unrelated transaction with the purchase of a new car."183 This
situation in which a creditor turns a debtor's antecedent, unrelated
debt into a purchase-money security interest is unlikely.184
No conceivable reason is readily ascertainable for car dealers or fin-
anciers to do so.' 8 5 A creditor holding a purchase-money security in-
terest in the debtor's antecedent credit card debt, for example, offers
that creditor little benefit. The car dealer or financier's interest in the
vehicle is already sufficiently protected in Chapter 13 bankruptcy;
they need not worry about the debtor's unsecured debt because they
will still receive the value of the entire claim under § 1325(a)(*), as-
suming that negative equity is part of a purchase-money security in-
terest. And even if the creditor is successful in transforming the
unsecured credit card debt into a purchase-money security interest,
that creditor will have first extinguished the prior creditor's claim.
The only thinkable benefit to creditors is if they manage to secure a
higher interest rate from the debtor. Thus, the creditor will merely
176. Id.
177. Id.; U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (2011).
178. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.; In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 854 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007).
182. Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 506 (6th Cir. 2010); Ford v.
Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1285-86 (10th Cir. 2009); In re Price, 562
F.3d at 627.
183. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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recoup the money paid to extinguish the antecedent debt under Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy, perchance a few interest payments as well. Most
important, though, is that this improbable procedure likely had no im-
pact on the debtor acquiring rights in the vehicle, destroying any sem-
blance of a close nexus. Aside from the creditor's position, the debtor
hardly has an interest in securing the debtor's unrelated past debts,
especially if folding in those debts has no bearing on the debtor's ac-
quisition of the vehicle. No reasonable debtor would opt to increase
his or her secured obligations if Chapter 13 bankruptcy is on the hori-
zon. Therefore, any predatory lending concern is both an unwar-
ranted abstraction from the problem § 1325(a)(*) aims to resolve and
a practice courts are well-equipped to pierce. 186
B. Legislative Intent & Policy
Both Congress's intent and the policy underlying § 1325(a)(*) entail
that negative equity is indeed included as part of a purchase-money
security interest under Chapter 13 bankruptcy.187 Congress appended
to § 1325(a) the "hanging paragraph," § 1325(a)(*), as part of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA)188 in response to complaints from dealers and finan-
ciers. 189 This amendment remedies situations in which a debtor ob-
tained approval of a payment plan under Chapter 13 bankruptcy,
allowing the debtor to keep the vehicle and to cram down the dealer's
or financier's claim to the depreciated value of the vehicle;190 in short,
the debtor walked away with a substantial discount on the vehicle
under Chapter 13 bankruptcy because of the speed at which a vehicle
devalues once the debtor obtains possession. The 2005 amendments
to BAPCPA disarm the debtor from utilizing this abusive tactic,
preventing the debtor from cramming down the entire claim to the
value of the collateral. 191 At issue here is whether negative equity is
protected from cram down as well.
186. The Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits recognize that the close nexus requirement will
preclude any absurd results, such as a rolled-in mortgage or credit card debt. See, e.g., In re
Westfall, 599 F.3d at 506; In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1285-86; In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627.
187. See infra Part III (discussing that the Uniform Commercial Code's text supports includ-
ing negative equity as part of a purchase-money security interest).
188. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No.
109-8, § 306, 119 Stat. 23, 80 (2005); Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d
1295, 1295 (11th Cir. 2008).
189. Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 2010).
190. Id. at 854-55.
191. Id.
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The title of the amendment to the Bankruptcy Code demonstrates
that Congress intended to provide greater protection for dealers and
financiers. Section 306 of BAPCPA is entitled "Giving Secured Credi-
tors Fair Treatment in Chapter 13."192 The title of the subsection
under which § 1325(a)(*) falls further discloses Congress's intent to
protect secured dealers and financiers: "Restoring the Foundation for
Secured Credit."193 Thus, the two titles taken together indicate an in-
tent to protect creditors under Chapter 13, though this is not determi-
native as to the extent of protection afforded to these creditors.
To read § 1325(a)(*) as proposed in this Note ultimately effectuates
the intent of Congress, which is "to protect secured car lenders from
having their claims bifurcated in Chapter 13."194 The main thrust of
§ 1325(a)(*) is to require debtors to fully repay the agreed amount for
a vehicle purchased within 910 days prior to Chapter 13 bankruptcy,
not merely the market value of the vehicle. 195 Because § 1325(a)(*)
"intended only good things for car lenders and other lienholders," an
interpretation that excluded negative equity would indeed be an ab-
surd result. 196  Specifically, this absurdity exists since courts have
gone so far as to say that the principal purpose of § 1325(a)(*) is to
secure the negative equity that occurs for any Chapter 13 debtor when
the vehicle is not worth the outstanding balance on the loan, despite
not being secured by collateral.197
Affirming Congress's intent to protect creditors is that it presuma-
bly knew of the substantial percentage of car finance plans that in-
clude negative equity.198 Nearly 40% of all new car purchases in the
United States in 2005 included negative equity financing.199 And with
car sales ranging from 6.8 to 8.1 million each year, millions of new car
192. BAPCPA § 306; see also Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618,
628 (4th Cir. 2009); Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008)
(noting that section headings "cannot substitute for the operative text of the statute," but are
one "tool[ ] available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute").
193. BAPCPA § 306.
194. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 628.
195. Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2008).
196. Id. at 1303.
197. See, e.g., In re Petrocci, 370 B.R. 489, 501 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2007) ("The primary pur-
pose of the hanging paragraph of Code § 1325(a)([*]) is, in fact, precisely to take the unsecured
negative equity debt which any Chapter 13 debtor has when his or her less than nine hundred
and ten day-old vehicle is not worth the outstanding loan balance, and, by refusing it the Code
§ 506 treatment, to transform it into secured debt not supported by collateral value, and then
require it to be paid in full to the detriment of other unsecured creditors."); In re Graupner, 537
F.3d at 1203 (citation omitted).
198. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 628.
199. Danny Hakim, supra note 10; Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d
1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 2009).
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transactions hinge on determining the scope of § 1325(a)(*): during
the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2011, there were 438,788
Chapter 13 filings. 200 Reading this section otherwise would vitiate
Congress's intent to protect a significant percentage of creditors in the
instance of negative equity financing;201 it "would have the effect of
excluding a substantial number of lawful auto finance transactions
that were industry practice when BAPCPA was enacted .".. ."202
Congress certainly did not intend to weaken the propriety of mil-
lions of new car transactions. No car dealer would extend credit to
pay off the debtor's outstanding balance on his or her old car unless a
purchase-money security interest would be created for the total
amount financed. 203 Any practice to the contrary would be detrimen-
tal to the business of car sellers or financiers, particularly because neg-
ative equity financing may represent a large proportion of the entire
transaction.204 Besides, the outstanding balance on the old car was
secured. 205 Debtors would receive an unwarranted windfall if that
once-secured debt became unsecured simply by rolling that debt into
a new car purchase. 206 In all likelihood, neither the loan for the old
car nor the loan for the new car would have been made without the
creditor retaining a secured interest for the entire amount, including
the negative equity portion.207 Congress was well aware of these con-
siderations, as well as the numerous transactions that would be af-
fected, and surely intended § 1325(a)(*) to encompass negative equity
financing.208
Essential to this result are the consequences flowing to other credi-
tors of the debtor.209 Purchase-money security interests "enjoy
'super-priority' over other types of security interests and liens." 210
Thus, the general rule, "first in time, first in right," does not apply to
200. Bankruptcy Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statis-
tics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2011/0311_f2.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
201. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 628.
202. In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1303.
203. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 636 F.3d 1175, 1176 (9th Cir.
2011) (Bea, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 1177.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. In re Penrod, 636 F.3d at 1177.
209. Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2010).
210. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir.
2010). See generally Gilmore, supra note 47 (discussing Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code's triumph in holding superior purchase-money security interests over after-acquired prop-
erty interests).
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seller- or financier-based purchase-money security interests.211 The
concern behind this general rule is that "new extensions of credit in-
crease the risk of default on the old." 2 12  However, the
purchase-money security interest minimizes the risk to first-in-time
secured parties both because it applies only to newly purchased prop-
erty and because the debt secured by this interest is "partially offset
by the value of the property bought with it."213 This reasoning simi-
larly applies to unsecured creditors. 214 The unsecured creditor faces a
lesser degree of harm as well because the value of the collateral par-
tially offsets the debt for which the secured creditor has a
purchase-money security interest.215 This situation is distinct from
that where a debtor grants a security interest in already acquired
property to a previously unsecured creditor.216 Under these circum-
stances, the creditor is precluded from obtaining a purchase-money
security interest that would otherwise prejudice first-in-time credi-
tors.217 Accordingly, purchase-money security interests need not ex-
clude negative equity financing-a practice that "may be essential to
the flourishing of the important market that consists of the sale of cars
on credit"-to protect creditors since such interests are limited to
newly acquired property and marginally affect prior creditors. 218
IV. COLLATERAL ISSUES
A. The Pseudo Circuit Split
In determining itself the outlier, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[w]e
decline to adopt the reasoning of our sister circuits. We acknowledge
that our decision creates a circuit split, and we do not do this
lightly." 219 However, the Ninth Circuit seems to have overlooked
what it later stated in its opinion: "[i]n bankruptcy, property interests
are usually defined by state law." 220 Thus, the circuit split the Ninth
211. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 845 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2008) ("This exception has generally been justified on equitable notions: it protects vendors of
goods from after-acquired property clauses generally used by banks and other financiers.").
212. In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 857.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (2011).
218. In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 858 (reasoning that Article 9 neither precludes this result nor
seeks to discourage credit transactions).
219. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir.
2010).
220. Id.
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Circuit admittedly created is a split only insofar as federal courts inter-
pret differently the laws of the states.
Further exposing the absurdity of this situation is the split among
certain district courts within the Ninth Circuit's territory. Currently,
Arizona district courts hold that negative equity financing is part of a
purchase-money security interest, preventing debtors from cramming
down a creditor's claim to the value of the collateral under
§ 1325(a)(*), 221 whereas Oregon, Washington, and California federal
courts have held otherwise. 222 This difference in treatment has cre-
ated a two-tiered split: a split between the circuit courts and a split
between district courts under a single circuit, e.g. the Ninth Circuit.
The two-tiered split is particularly troublesome because district courts
deciding under state law different from its circuit court may feel con-
strained, even though they are appealing to a distinct, separate body
of law from which the definitions of property interests are derived.
On one hand, the majority of circuit courts consider negative equity
financing as part of a purchase-money security interest; but on the
other hand, a district court under the Ninth Circuit, for instance, may
feel inclined to align itself to its appellate court, despite ruling under a
differently body of law; although, the statutes are admittedly the same
between the states.
The Second Circuit probably approached this issue best. Instead of
relying on its own interpretation of New York law, the court certified
question to the New York Court of Appeals: "[w]e believe that these
questions-which are exquisitely state law issues, despite their rele-
vance to our interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code-are best consid-
ered by New York's highest court. We therefore offer the New York
Court of Appeals the opportunity to guide us, should it opt to do so
... ."223 No other federal circuit court has approached this issue by
certifying question to the controlling state's highest court, regardless
of the intimate connection to state law. Though this method could
have disposed of this issue with much less confusion, the majority of
circuit courts nevertheless reached the right result and held negative
equity as part of a purchase-money security interest.
221. See, e.g., In re Lyons, No. 2:08-bk-13657-SSC, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1159 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
May 13, 2009); In re Brei, No. 4:07-bk-01354-JMM, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3924 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
Nov. 14, 2007).
222. See, e.g., In re Penrod, 611 F.3d at 1158; In re Riach, No. 07-61645-aerl3, 2008 Bankr.
LEXIS 461 (Bankr. D. Ore. Feb. 19, 2008); In re Wear, No. 07-42537, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 208
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. Jan. 23, 2008) (unpublished).
223. Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d 177, 186 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis
added).
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B. Congressional Action Not Needed
Congress need not clarify its intent as to the status of negative eq-
uity under § 1325(a)(*). At least one commentator has suggested its
involvement in the wake of the General Motors bailout and the reces-
sion.224 However, complete consistency in bankruptcy cannot be at-
tained, simply because property interests are issues of state law.22 5
Section 1325(a)(*) thus makes clear that a creditor having a
purchase-money security interest will be made whole under Chapter
13 bankruptcy for the entire amount, leaving room for the states to
determine the scope of purchase-money security interest.226 State
legislatures displeased with the results reached by the federal courts,
or with the highest court in New York's case, are free to explicitly
define the scope of a purchase-money security interest for purposes of
§ 1325(a)(*).
Even if Congress decides to define purchase-money security inter-
est under the Bankruptcy Code, car sellers and financiers are free to
adjust interest rates to account for any change in risk. Creditors in
debtor-friendly jurisdictions, such as California, may either increase
the individual debtor's interest rate or marginally increase the interest
rate for all debtors to account for the risk that any negative equity
financed will not retain its status as a purchase-money security inter-
est in Chapter 13 bankruptcy. If Congress subsequently decides to
require uniform adoption of the majority approach, i.e. including neg-
ative equity financing as part of a purchase-money security interest,
the interest rates to debtors will likely decrease because of the de-
creased risk to creditors when the debtor files for Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy. Conversely, creditor-friendly jurisdictions likely provide lower
interest rates to new car purchasers because creditors will recover the
entire amount from a debtor filing Chapter 13 bankruptcy; and any
change to the contrary will have the effect of increasing interest rates
for buyers, reflecting the increased risk posed to car dealers or finan-
ciers. Though many other factors play into setting interest rates, this
issue certainly has significant impact because negative equity may
amount to approximately a quarter of the total amount financed. 227
Thus, the scope of security interests has loss-allocating implications.
The majority rule places accountability on debtors because they will
be responsible for the entire amount under Chapter 13 and thus deters
224. Collins, supra note 16, at 188-89.
225. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (citation omitted); In re Peaslee, 547 F.3d
at 186.
226. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(*) (2006).
227. See infra Part II(C) (discussing the portion of negative equity in new car purchases).
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irresponsible borrowing. Under the minority rule, however, creditors
may increase interest rates on a debtor-to-debtor basis or distribute
risk among all debtors by marginally increasing interest rates, but may
also be subject to the abuse this rule allows under § 506, i.e. allowing
the debtor to pay for the depreciated value of the car.
Because state law typically defines property interests,228 the individ-
ual states should determine this instance of loss allocation; a position
recognized by the Supreme Court when it denied certiorari. 229 This is
especially so because creditors will likely account for any change in
risk posed by a change in the scope of property interests. Again, Con-
gress should not feel compelled to act to resolve this pseudo split; the
resulting loss allocation implications are merely derivative of a state's
defined property interests-an issue "exquisitely" belonging to the
states.230
V. CONCLUSION
This Note argued that negative equity financing is indeed protected
from bifurcation under § 1325(a)(*) principally because a liberal read-
ing of the Uniform Commercial Code-as it suggests it should be
read-urges a finding that purchase-money security interest may in-
clude such financing. The two-step framework outlined in Part III and
derived from judicial reasoning offers a sound method for resolving
this issue. What this framework discloses is that both car sellers and
third party financiers may include negative equity financing as part of
a purchase-money security interest, provided that a close nexus exists
between the new car transaction and the negative equity financing. A
close nexus exists under the circumstances in which this Note's issue
arises because the new vehicle transaction could not occur except for
the negative equity financing. Accordingly, the two-step framework is
satisfied and thus precludes classifying negative equity financing as a
nonpurchase-money security interest.
While reasoned solely through a textual analysis, the result of the
two-step framework comports with policies underlying BAPCPA and
the Uniform Commercial Code. New car transactions wherein the
creditor pays off the balance on the debtor's old car represent a sub-
stantial portion of car transactions in the United States, and negative
equity financing allows these otherwise unrealizable deals to be made.
An.undue windfall would flow to debtors filing for Chapter 13 bank-
228. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.
229. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 108 (2011).
230. In re Peaslee, 547 F.3d at 186.
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ruptcy if rolled-in negative equity, which prior to the acquisition of the
new car would be protected under § 1325(a)(*), is stripped from the
purchase-money security interest. BAPCPA aims to prevent bank-
ruptcy abuse, and to hold negative equity financing as a nonpur-
chase-money security interest would cut against that express policy.
Thus, the consequences of and the policies for negative equity financ-
ing, as well as the text from which purchase-money security interest is
defined, soundly demonstrate that negative equity financing under
§ 1325(a)(*) retains its status as a purchase-money security interest.

